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To write about Auschwitz 1 is to expose oneself to certain risks that gather 
around the remembrance of the Jewish deportees and other ‘deficient’ strands 
of humanity who were killed in the Nazi genocide. These risks are of an 
incomparably different kind from the ones to which Jewish populations of 
Europe were exposed during the Second World War: they concern only 
credibility and reputation, and not the economy ‘of flame and of ashes’ that 
came into being after the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 (Derrida, 
1989: 1). And yet these risks are significant, for the historical reality of 
Auschwitz has become part of political and religious disputes that continue to 
replay the annihilationist fervour of National Socialism. The religious 
fundamentalisms, ultra-nationalisms, and neo-fascisms that have arisen since 
the turn of the millennium, have attained a destructive intensity that seems to 
be endemic in the global-bio-technological regime of capital. The risks that are 
taken in critical-philosophical interventions in debates about Auschwitz 
therefore are significant because they are concerned with the ways in which 
the industrialized killing of over six million Jews, Roma and ‘politicals’ should 
be remembered. To argue, as I will in this paper, that the ‘fact of Auschwitz’ 
does not have a strictly ‘factual’ reality, and that its ethical significance has to 
be conceived independently of narratives of fate, retribution, and the will of 
God, is to risk putting oneself in the position of the ‘historical relativist’ who 
would seek to undermine the truth of the Nazi genocide. I will argue however 
that it is only by tracing the event of Auschwitz to a pivotal moment in the 
evolution of the relationship between culture, technology and collective 
memory, that it is possible to understand what is at stake in the uniqueness of 
the suffering that took place in the Nazi death camps, and how that suffering 
 3 
should be redeemed through an ethics of remembrance whose telos is the 
future existence of the human species.   
 In essence, my paper is concerned with the return of fascism, as a 
racial-biopolitical ideology, after the event of Auschwitz. Liberal and neoliberal 
theorists have tended to regard the revelation of the scale of the Nazi 
genocide as marking the end of fascism’s mass appeal: public recognition of 
the consequences of its racial ideology (the Final Solution, the Second World 
War, and the destruction of the German state) is conceived as having brought 
about a transformation in the culture of humanity whose organization as 
ethics, memory and political authority prevents repetition of its biopolitical 
violence (Fukuyama, 1992: 16-17). And yet in the last twenty years there has 
been an unprecedented rise in the neo-fascisms, ultra-nationalisms, and 
religious fundamentalisms that calls into question the claim that fascist 
politics, as the mass policing of racial-biopolitical hierarchies, has been 
permanently consigned to the margins of the neoliberal consensus. My 
primary concerns therefore are to trace the biopolitical logic which underlies 
the revitalizations of nationalism, fascism, and religious fundamentalism that 
have taken place in our present, and to register the fate of Auschwitz, as a 
historical event, within the constellation of economic and geopolitical effects 
that have been produced by this process of biopolitical transformation.   
 The origin of this approach to the remembrance of historical events can 
be traced to Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, where it 
is the figure of Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’ that configures the infinite 
yearning of humanity for a timeless order of love and recognition. The angel, 
whose back is turned to the future, can only make partial and distracted sense 
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of the wreckage of everything that humanity has tried to build, and it is in this 
sense that his experience is like that of human beings. For insofar as he can 
never ‘awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed’ 
(Benjamin, 1992: 249), he experiences the same tragic contamination of truth 
and violence that is the essence of human history. Every historical epoch is a 
‘state of emergency’ that is born of its inheriting the absence of redemption 
that humanity is fated to endure. The question that emerges from this idea of 
the present as a perpetual state of crisis therefore concerns the relationship 
between the human experience of time, and the technological means of 
representation through which that experience is supplemented. Clearly there 
is a sense in which Benjamin regards the advent of kinaesthetic technology as 
giving rise to an alternative imaginary that exceeds the repetitive violence of 
authoritarian mythologies. And yet the epilogue to ‘The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction’ reveals the underlying power of film to intensify 
those mythologies, that is, to reinvigorate the ‘aura’ of the race, the Volk, and 
the Fürher (Benjamin 1992: 234-235). It is the evolution of this power of 
technological intensification, I will argue, that is key to understanding the 
return of fascism, as a biopolitical regime, to our own historical present.  
 The readings of Giorgio Agamben and Bernard Stiegler I will present 
are concerned with how the biopolitical violence which has continued after the 
after the event of Auschwitz, is related to a particular set of effects that have 
arisen from the technological processes of the globalization. The most 
significant of these are: the digital-technological evolution of mass society (i.e. 
the universal programming of human cognition and desire); the rise of a post-
reflexive politics whose formal expression is the state of civil emergency; the 
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explicitly genocidal intent of the neo-fascisms, religious fundamentalisms, and 
ultra-nationalisms that have appeared since the turn of the millennium; and 
the emergence of an explicitly transhumanist orientation in the economic 
ideology of capital (i.e. the assumption of an infinite adaptability of the human 
species to increasingly autonomous technological networks). In Agamben’s 
work the normalization of extra-legal violence that has taken place in Western 
democracies, is presented as an outcome of the biotechnological systems 
through which specific ‘others’ are designated as objective threats to the 
integrity of the state. The ethical demand of those who come seeking help 
with only their physical life to recommend them, in other words, is 
automatically superseded by their media-bio-political depiction as ‘asylum 
seekers’, ‘fundamentalists’ ‘disease carriers’, ‘refugees’, or ‘economic 
migrants’. I will argue that this biopolitical appropriation of those that come as 
‘bare life’, or Homo sacer, is precisely what is at stake in Stiegler’s account of 
epiphylogenetic memory. For it is only insofar as he is able to show that the 
powers of technological representation through which the economies of law, 
capital, and politics are objectively coordinated, are also the means to new 
modalities of subjective praxis and cultural inheritance, that the event of 
Auschwitz can retain its ethical significance in the unfolding of human history. 
 In what follows I will argue that the event of Auschwitz is both revealed 
and dissimulated in the global-biopolitical economy of capital, and how the 
chance of its remembrance is recalled to the events of violence and exclusion 
this economy systematically produces. My argument is in three parts. The first 
is concerned with elaborating the concept of epiphylogenetic memory which 
Stiegler develops in Technics and Time volume one, or, more precisely, with 
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the economy of trauma and remembrance it configures and how this is related 
to the social, political and techno-economic dimensions of the crisis that 
developed in Weimar Germany. The second part develops a rereading of 
what have become known, somewhat pejoratively, as ‘mass society’ theories 
of fascism. These theories provide a crucial insight into the libidinal dynamics 
of Nazism: for without the connections that are drawn by Arendt, Horkheimer 
and Adorno between the ‘objective’ forces of capital and the social, political 
and psychical dynamics of the masses, there can be no adequate explanation 
of Hitler’s seizure of power and the execution of the final solution. This 
German tradition of critical theory however tends to reify the instruments of 
cultural and aesthetic expression, and to present their development after 
Auschwitz as threatening a relentless degradation of humanity to its basest 
functions of work, reproduction and enjoyment. In section three therefore, I 
will set out the terms of an encounter between Agamben, as the inheritor of a 
German critique of mass society that goes back to Martin Heidegger, and 
Stiegler’s account of the affective dynamics of technological-epiphylogenetic 
memory. I will conclude by arguing that what is at stake in this encounter is 
the future of Auschwitz as the sign, or ‘tensor’, of a collective trauma which 
inhabits the evolving structures of biotechnological life.   
Stiegler: Epiphylogenetic Memory  
Stiegler’s concept of epiphylogenetic memory designates a very specific 
relationship between the objective-technological conditions of human history, 
and the forms of intersubjective culture through which that necessity, which is 
always traumatic in its effects, is mediated. The term phylogenesis refers to 
the way in which animal species are differentiated into subgroups that retain 
 7 
the same genetic characteristics but which exhibit significant variations in their 
adaptation to environmental conditions. The concept of epi-phylogenesis that 
Stiegler develops in Technics and Time presents the idea that human beings, 
as an originally technological mode of life, are fated to enact a history in which 
their ‘ethnic’ differentiation is accomplished through instruments that 
constantly rupture the process of phylogenetic reproduction (1998: 140). This 
means that the history of the human species is originally bound up with the 
technological reproduction of culture; for it is in the spheres of inscription and 
graphical representation that the world is ‘invented’ through heterogeneous 
modes of language, aesthetic technique and philosophical discourse. There is 
then a certain reflexive, or noetic, demand that, for Stiegler, haunts the 
economy of human culture. For the experience of work, satisfaction and 
desire that is sustained in the symbolic order of collective life, is what 
provokes generationally specific reflections on the normative and juridical 
tradition of the state, and its relationship to the transformative effects of 
technology (1998: 183-203). The messianic possibility that is sustained by the 
Humanities (art, literature, philosophy, theology) therefore comes from their 
capacity to enact of the trauma of this reflection: they express the implicit, 
countervailing tendency of culture within the regime of socio-technological 
reproduction. According to Stiegler, these two spheres ‘compose’ with one 
another in such a way that the history of human society unfolds, firstly, 
through the evolution of technologies that constantly rupture the process of 
moral and cultural individuation, and secondly, the channelling of a collective 
sense of disorientation into performative acts that seek to revitalize the 
symbolic economy of social life (2013a: 102-126). This possibility of 
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expressive performance is essentially related to the concept of spirit that runs 
throughout Stiegler’s work and which is crucial to understanding the ethical 
significance of Auschwitz in the future unfolding of human history (Abbinnett, 
2015: 76-79).  
 The concept of history that arises from Stiegler’s originary technicity 
thesis involves a complex interweaving of the intentional faculties that are 
associated with the theological and philosophical discourse of spirit, and the 
technological and utilitarian necessities that are associated with the capitalist 
economy. The relationship between these two elements is non-dialectical in 
the sense that each composes with the other to produce moments of extreme 
crisis, none of which is capable of resolving the contradiction between spirit, 
technology and economy that forms the fate of the human species. In fact, for 
Stiegler, the hope that arises from this catastrophic history consists in 
preserving the antagonism between technological capitalization and the 
reflexive and aesthetic spontaneity this has provoked in the social and 
individual life of human beings (2014: 46-48). The originary technicity thesis 
therefore anticipates the advent of modernity as a profound and episodic 
crisis of spirit engendered by the development of technological systems (mass 
media, industrial reproducibility, biomedical technologies etc) that threaten the 
human capacity for cultural inheritance, moral recognition and aesthetic self-
expression. The dynamics of this catastrophe is anticipated in Stiegler’s 
rereading of the Promethean myth as the erasure of the sensory-aesthetic 
and reflexive-noetic elements of culture that is threatened by constant 
innovation in the regime of technoscientific reproduction (1998: 186). 
Hyperindustrial modernity, in other words, is a crisis point that has haunted 
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the logic of technical development since its inception: it is the possibility of a 
total destruction of reflexive and aesthetic culture that would leave human 
beings open to processes of biopolitical violence that, in the long run, they 
could not survive (2013b: 9-36; Agamben, 1999: 82-86).  
 The pivotal question that arises here concerns the place of Auschwitz 
in the history of the human species and the possibility of its being 
remembered as the defining moment in the relationship between human 
beings and their technological environment. As I have said, Stiegler’s idea of 
epiphylogenesis leads to the conclusion that human history develops through 
a more and more intense experience of the technological damage that is done 
to the symbolic relations of social life. This is the outcome of the movement of 
machine technology towards a certain degree of performative autonomy: 
human individuals come under the control of cybernetic systems that regulate 
the temporality of their somatic and psychical life. Consequently, the evolution 
of ‘technics’ into the economy of ‘technoscience’ is conceived by Stiegler as 
expressing a teleological development, in which the necessity of historical 
events is shifted from the orthographic economy of inscription (objective 
spirit), to the constantly evolving powers of prosthetic programmes and 
environments (1998: 36-37) and (2011a: 187-190). Auschwitz therefore 
should be understood as a historical sign that haunts the media-technological 
programmes through which the biopolitical organization of capital has been 
accomplished. Mass society theories, as we will see, have tended to 
underplay the radical affects that are gathered in the event of Auschwitz. For 
insofar as they view the execution of the Nazi genocide as the outcome of an 
‘objective tendency’ towards technocratic control, there is little hope for ethical 
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remembrance beyond the formal transformation of the law and public 
pedagogy. In the section that follows I will set out a Stieglerian reading of the 
biopolitical dimension of power that was developed in the Frankfurt School 
account of the Nazi apparatus. Before this however, I need make some brief 
remarks about the structure of aesthetic affect that is sustained in Stiegler’s 
account of epiphylogenetic memory, and how this changes the relationship 
between the violence of human history and its absorption into the repetitive 
forms of the culture and programming industries.     
 In his work on the decadence of Western industrial democracies, 
Stiegler argues that the digital networks that support human memory and 
experience are now such that they can ‘annul’ the differential effects that are 
produced among the discrete individuals that make up the audience (if this is 
a term that can still be applied to the ‘subjects’ of immersive media 
technologies) (2014: 34-35). Digital media networks and virtual-aesthetic 
programmes are able automatically to incorporate the psychical trauma they 
provoke through their representations of historical events. Our experience of 
the living present is subject to processes of redaction through which the past, 
which has always been technically inscribed, is instantaneously dispersed 
among increasingly sophisticated simulacra (2009: 93-96). The outcome at 
which this process aims is the erasure of the psychical affect that has been 
put back into play by the structure of the image, or more specifically, the 
perfection of the processes of repetition through which the symbolic reality of 
the past, as the reference point of the living present, finally passes out of 
existence. Yet it is the intensity of this process of technological re-staging, and 
the fact that it seeks a permanent separation of the present from the history of 
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violence perpetrated in the political life of Homo sapiens, that reanimates the 
psychological trauma (the clash of Eros and Thanatos) that is the origin of 
artistic expression. According to Stiegler, art is responsible for bringing the 
memory of violence to the surface of self-consciousness, that is, for revealing 
both the iterative-repressive structure of the forms through which that memory 
is encoded (film, digital medial, virtual aesthetic programmes, haptic 
environments), and for intensifying the sensory affect that haunts the 
simulation of the past. As he put it in Symbolic Misery        
The question at this stage is to understand how it is possible that 
what I have called an ‘objective primary retention’ [a sensory event] 
should suddenly become the katharsis as well as the catylist - of 
individuation, and in sense the katastrophē - of individuation which 
is to say, the trigger of a quantum leap that liberates the 
unexpected of a traumatype. Such a traumatype, for which a work 
of art may be a projection support, does not simply belong to a 
noetic soul: it belongs to the pre-individual ground of all noetic 
souls, and it is in this way that it penetrates the defensive barrier of 
the stereotypes (2015: 152).  
The work of art, in other words, is a work of ‘spirit’ in the sense that it belongs 
to the organological constitution Dasein: its poiesis gives expression to the 
violence that comes with the originary process of technological 
supplementation, and gives rise to cathartic affects that haunt the economies 
of freedom and necessity, memory and inheritance, produced by the culture 
and programming industries.   
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 The experience of messianicity that is sustained in Stiegler’s account of 
epiphylogenetic memory is essentially related to art as a mode of spiritual 
performance that can be executed within the virtual networks of technological 
societies. The question of the fate of art in the time of technological 
reproducibility, of course, has a long history and was the source of the tension 
between Adorno and Benjamin over the possibility of a mass revolutionary 
aesthetic (Adorno et al, 1994: 110-141). Stiegler’s position is perhaps closer 
to Benjamin than to Adorno, in the sense that he conceives representational 
technologies as ‘tertiary supports’ whose supplementation of the faculties of 
imagination, affection and reflection constantly transform that relationship that 
we, as living beings in default of essence, have to our own historical past. 
Epiphylogenetic memory, in other words, is originally constituted as a zone in 
which the iterative potential of the image (as cultic inscription, analogue 
chromatic differentiation, digital pixilation etc) is haunted by spectres of who 
and what is not represented in the technological encoding of life. However, 
there is a certain reserve in Stiegler’s relationship to the political aesthetic that 
comes into being with cinematic time, which comes from the conviction that 
programming industries are on the verge of perfecting the regime of 
technoscientific simulation. This returns us to the Adornian question of which, 
if any, aesthetic form/genre is appropriate to represent the event of Auschwitz, 
as each of them (film, painting, literature, poetry, music) tends to reduce the 
inhuman suffering of the victims to palatable stories about love, heroism and 
personal redemption. I will argue that the idea of the genre, as reductive 
technique, cannot be applied to the practice of technological art. Its 
interventions are provoked by the dynamic that takes place between the 
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unlived past (collective memory), the force of the law, and the biopolitical 
organization of life, and so it has emerged as a potentially non-generic field 
that is in a constant state of flux and transformation. In the final section of the 
paper I will develop the idea that Auschwitz is a ‘tensor’ 2 within this economy 
of remembrance, and that its affective demand is the source of an ethico-
aesthetics of biopolitical life. For the moment however it is necessary to set 
out the relationship between aesthetics and biopower that, from the 
perspective of epiphylogenesis, can be traced in mass society theories of 
politics.   
Nazism: Death and Mass Society  
In his book Remnants of Auschwitz Giorgio Agamben passed the following 
judgement on Holocaust theologies that seek to explain the Nazi genocide in 
terms of God’s kenotic separation from the world: ‘Behind the powerlessness 
of God peeps the powerlessness of men, who continue to cry “may that never 
happen again” when “that” is everywhere’ (1999: 20). Thus, the question of 
how human beings are to redeem the violence of the world they have made, 
and of the ethical significance of Auschwitz in this redemption, in other words, 
must be referred to the biopolitical systems that have become the condition of 
human life and experience. The original analysis of this regime as the 
standardization of production, consumption and desire is presented in the 
Frankfurt School account of mass society, and further elaborated in Hannah 
Arendt’s work on violence and political authority. This section will examine the 
relationship between Ardent, Adorno and Horkheimer’s respective theories of 
an emergent biopolitics, and the new phenomenologies of memory that are 
traced by Stiegler and Agamben in the networks of the global economy.   
 14 
 As we have seen, the economy of epiphylogenetic transmission that 
Stiegler presents in the first volume of Technics and Time is the core of what 
he calls the ‘technological tendency’ of human civilization (1998: 36-46). He 
maintains that in order to understand the relationship between the objective 
elements of the social system (what he calls subsistence, economy, or 
negotium) and the reflective faculties of human individuals (what he calls 
noesis, or otium), it is necessary to theorize how each ‘composes’ with the 
other within the totality of social life. So, on the one hand, the orthographic 
and aesthetic regimes that have developed through human history are the 
means through which cultural forms of reflection and sensory cathexis are 
disseminated, while on the other, these regimes are always subject to the 
effects of innovation in the utilitarian networks of human society (1998: 49-60). 
What Stiegler conceives as the therapeutic function of culture has always 
been threatened by technological changes in the realm of work and economy, 
and by the representational techniques through which culture is transmitted. 
This however does not take the form of a thoroughgoing technological 
determinism. Rather, Stiegler’s contention is that the unfolding of human 
history is simultaneously catastrophic and redemptive: the objective, self-
coordinating element of technological evolution is such that it produces effects 
of moral, cultural and economic dislocation whose intensities cannot be 
foreseen, and also provides new forms of affective, intuitive and reflexive 
apprehension through which the fate of technological Dasein can be re-
imagined (1998: 61-67). The de facto individuation of the human species 
through technological programmes therefore always solicits reinventions of 
the cultural milieux in which it reproduces its spiritual-symbolic value. For in 
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the absence of this kind of performativity, which is itself technological, the 
biopolitical reproduction of human beings as ‘bare life’ tends to fill the void of 
political culture (2013a: 17-19) and (Agamben, 1998: 126-135)   
 The Frankfurt School analysis of the effects of rationalization and 
technocratic control is the foundation of Agamben’s work on the biopolitical 
trajectory of Western politics after Auschwitz. In order to understand the this 
continuity, we need to extend the theory of mass society developed by Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno to include Hannah Arendt’s work on the 
banality of evil and its relationship to the technological organization of life. The 
essential characteristic of mass society theories of fascism is the association 
that is made between the loss of mimetic activity in social life and the sense of 
death that haunts the process of rationalization (Adorno, 1999: 58-60) and 
(Arendt, 1977: 273). The primary factor in the rise of Nazism is presented as 
its appeal to a ‘natural order’ of race whose differentiation of life into zoë and 
bios, Jew and Aryan, is being destroyed by the uncontrolled expansion of 
capitalism and its technological apparatus (Arendt, 1979), (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 1986) and (Horkheimer, 2004). And so the fact that the masses 
became obsessed with the cult of the Führer, and with the mission to restore 
the ‘sacred life’ of the Volk, should be understood in terms of the feeling of 
proximity to anonymous death that had become part of everyday life in 
Weimar. The biopolitical designation of ‘the Jew’ as parasite therefore, arose 
within an ideological discourse that interpreted the economic and 
technological apparatus of capitalism as the instruments of a process through 
which Aryan culture was being liquidated by an inferior form of humanity. This 
articulation of the biopolitical economy of Nazism, as I have said, is essential 
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to understanding the transformation of moral and political agency that brought 
about the electoral success of the NSDAP and the establishment of the Hitler 
dictatorship. However, the way this is formulated by Arendt, Horkheimer and 
Adorno and, later on, by Agamben, tends to conceive ‘the masses’ as the 
object of a technological history whose unfolding after Auschwitz threatens to 
erase all traces of subjective spirit from human society.    
 It is in the light of this trajectory that Adorno presents the aesthetic and 
pedagogical forms of remembrance that, for him, are necessary after 
Auschwitz, and Arendt describes the outlines of a cosmopolitan law that 
would be able to respond to the technological attrition of humanity. In 
Adorno’s case we have seen that the scope of moral education after 
Auschwitz is limited to a utilitarian reconstruction of self-interest which has 
little connection with the esoteric expressions of damage and obscenity that 
are the purpose of his negative aesthetics (2005: 102). The focus of Arendt’s 
account of the Eichmann trial, on the other hand, is on the progress that the 
legal proceedings made towards framing a formal definition of crimes against 
humanity (1977: 274). She regarded the Eichmann trial as having made some 
progress over the precedents established at Nuremburg (which insisted on 
treating ‘crimes against humanity’ as special instances of the overzealous 
brutality that made up the sphere of ‘war crimes’), but maintained that in the 
end it failed to make significant progress in framing a new sphere of 
cosmopolitan justice. The fundamental concern that underlies Arendt’s 
account of the Eichmann trial is that the evolution of technological systems 
will be such that the organization of human beings through the biopolitical 
imperatives of capital, will give rise to a system of anomic destruction that is 
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normalized through the ordinary representations of technoscientific culture. 
Thus, it is the objective conditions of the world after Auschwitz - the 
population explosion, the development of machines that constantly diminish 
the need for human labour, and the potential use of nuclear technology in the 
disposal of ‘surplus populations’ - that establish the absolute necessity of an 
International Court of Justice (1977: 270). Arendt understood as early as the 
mid-1950s that the context of international right is the biopolitical disposal of 
human beings through the evolving powers of technological systems (this 
point is reiterated six years later in her essay On Violence) (1970: 81-83). And 
so it is in her work that we find the source of Agamben’s juridical reflection on 
the technological enframing of Being and the fate of political sovereignty after 
Auschwitz.       
 The theories of mass society that are presented by Horkheimer, 
Adorno and Arendt are the first to reveal the entanglement of the law with the 
biopolitical organization of life and the technological means of representation. 
Their respective accounts of Nazism present two sides of a non-dialectical 
relationship in which the more efficient the networks of industrialized society 
become, the less chance there is of preserving the legal, ethical, political and 
aesthetic spheres which constitute the spirit of civil society. This problematic 
brings us to the two post-Auschwitz trajectories that are staked out by Stiegler 
and Agamben. In Agamben’s work the unfolding of the relationship between 
capitalism and technology is seen as having followed a strictly biopolitical 
path: the state has been reduced to its barest executive functions and has 
become the instrument of an endemic violence that is practiced against those 
who are seen as threatening the integrity of its borders and/or the biological 
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vigour of its population. This is made clear in the essay ‘What is an 
Apparatus?’ where he proposes a ‘general and massive partitioning of beings 
into two large classes: living beings . . . and the apparatuses in which living 
beings are incessantly captured’ (2009: 13). Stiegler’s work, on the other 
hand, demands a re-evaluation of Agamben’s inheritance of the biopolitical 
assumptions of mass society theory. In the following section I will argue that 
Agamben’s account of the death camps as the telos of biopolitical forms of 
sovereignty, remains caught in the logic of technocratic domination that is 
implicit in Adorno and Arendt’s work on the remembrance of Auschwitz. 
Agamben’s inheritance of their work is complex and raises important 
questions about the law and the ethics of representation in the time of 
biopolitical capitalism. In the end however his refusal to acknowledge the 
dualistic, or pharmacological, structure of subjective affect that is put into play 
by the digitization of experience, is key to understanding the reversion to a 
Heideggerian account of messianicity 3 in his work on the redemption of 
Auschwitz.     
 The political orientation of Horkheimer’s work is subtly different from 
that of Adorno, in the sense that although he accepts the tendency of the 
techno-economic complex of capital to reduce human beings to fungible units, 
he also entertains the possibility that ‘industrial discipline, technological 
progress, and scientific enlightenment . . . promise to usher in a new era in 
which individuality may re-emerge as an element in a more humane form of 
existence’ (2004: 108). Horkheimer, in other words, had a sense that the 
technoscientific transformation of collective life that took place in late 
modernity, and which was undoubtedly implicated in the formation of Nazi 
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ideology as the ‘revolt of nature’, also opens the possibility of new forms of 
political and aesthetic community that could express free individual existence 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 2011: 48) and (Horkheimer, 2004: 81). The exact 
nature of this possibility is, in a strong sense, impossible to grasp if the event 
of Auschwitz is understood in strictly Adornian terms, that is, as confirming an 
eternal circularity in the relationship between biopolitical violence, 
capitalization and technological innovation. If however, we shift our 
perspective on ‘technics’ from that of a purely external danger to the moral 
and legal community of human beings (a position which continued to trouble 
Walter Benjamin’s account of the technological image) to an organological 
understanding of its place in the evolution of noetic culture, then the event of 
Auschwitz emerges as a traumatological experience that haunts the 
biopolitical organization of life (1992: 211-244). There might, to paraphrase 
Stiegler’s reading of Arendt, be a chance of redeeming the law as an 
expression of the self-creativity of technological Dasein or, more precisely, as 
the form in which the human capacity for reimagining and reinventing itself is 
protected (Arendt, 1979: 474-479) and (Stiegler, 2011b: 19-121).    
Auschwitz: Trauma and Remembrance 
In the part three of Minima Moralia Adorno argued that, in the time of the 
rational-technological capitalism that emerged after Auschwitz, ‘dying merely 
confirms the absolute irrelevance of the natural organism in the face of the 
social absolute’ (1999: 232). This claim is essentially biopolitical, for the 
means of controlling ‘the people’, as the dangerous residue of bare life that 
haunts the legally constituted order of utility and inequality, are the 
paramilitary organizations, detention centres and camps that have been set 
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up during the recurrent crises of the global economy. The political activity of 
the state is concentrated in its ability to divide the population into racially, 
culturally and ethnically privileged ‘citizens’ and those who can be killed, 
tortured or segregated without risk of prosecution. Typically, this process 
takes the form of an escalatory relationship between an external threat that 
has been putatively identified by the state as real, and the withdrawal of 
democratic rights from those citizens who are seen as having a racial, 
cultural, religious or ethnic allegiance to the perpetrators of that threat. By 
intensifying their ideological and mythological inventions of the other, Western 
states constantly reopen the chance that the civic virtue of the police will fail 
and those who have been designated as bare life, or Homo sacer, will be 
interned or murdered. This, according to Agamben, is the ‘objective’ trajectory 
of liberal democracies. For insofar as the reversion to emergency powers has 
become the normal condition of politics, the world is poised between the 
tendency of Western states to become machines that pursue unconditionally 
the protection of their ‘legitimate’ citizens, and the destructive potential of 
those who have been damaged by the drift towards endemic biopolitical 
violence (1998: 176). Thus, the pivotal question that arises from this trjectory 
is concerned, firstly, with remembrance of the Nazi death camps as ‘the most 
absolute conditio inhumana that has ever existed on earth’ (1998: 166), and 
secondly, with the chance of a politics that could challenge the iteration of 
biopolitical sovereignty in which the event of Auschwitz has been caught up 
(2005: 61-63).  
 In his account of the structure of epiphylogenetic memory Stiegler 
maintains that ‘we always understand the history of philosophy qua the most 
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radical form of the knowledge of the de-fault as a history of mistakes, 
awkwardnesses, distortions, and sinister failings that had to be, or that will 
have had to be’ (1998: 210, authors italics). This suggests that the history of 
humanity, as the species whose evolution is originally technological, has a 
catastrophic tendency that cannot be overcome (as the means to this 
overcoming are always already technological), but which can be moderated 
by critical attention to the spiritual-noetic life that is essential to human society 
as such. The possibility of this moderation, which for Stiegler has always been 
at stake in Western philosophy, comes from the fact of humanity’s de-fault of 
being, that is, from its reliance on technological programmes whose effects it 
cannot completely anticipate or control. Practical philosophical reflection, or 
otium, takes place between the demand for duration, stability and composition 
that has informed the history of Western metaphysics, and the disruptive 
effects of technology on the institutional forms in which those categories have 
been temporally organized (2011b: 116-119). Remembrance of the wars, 
genocides and exterminations which technological instruments have made 
possible therefore, opens the possibility of choosing to curtail the aesthetic, 
economistic and technocratic compulsions that have come to dominate the 
process of cultural individuation in hyperindustrial societies. And so Stiegler’s 
contention that the history of philosophy is the history of the spiritual-noetic 
capacity of human beings to reflect on the fate of their collective existence, 
brings together two apparently contradictory elements: the Nietzschean idea 
of amor fati, or love of fate, and the concept of a sacred responsibility to 
redeem the past and thereby ameliorate the future suffering of humanity. 
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 In one of his last books, Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are, 
Nietzsche remarked that  
My formula for human greatness is amor fati: not wanting anything 
to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not 
just enduring what is necessary, still less concealing it - all idealism 
is hypocrisy in the face of what is necessary - but loving it (2007: 
35).        
This seems to entail that the idea of amor fati, of loving fate, belongs to a 
philosophy of individual will that is entirely incompatible with an ethical 
remembrance of Auschwitz. Nietzsche’s contention would seem to lend itself 
to those conservative theorists, such as Carl Schmitt, who see the fate of 
humanity as eternally dependent on the maintenance of friend-enemy 
distinctions in which all parties fulfil their obligation to be effective and 
respectable adversaries (1996: 27-37). This, of course, is not the import of 
Stiegler’s remark on the necessity of regarding the ‘sinister failures’ of human 
history as events that ‘will have had to be’. Rather, his position is that the love 
of fate which is the horizon of the philosophical impulse in human beings 
arises from their originary technicity; it is constantly re-formed through the 
damages that are done through the very instruments that have produced their 
social, cultural and economic elevation. From the perspective of 
epiphylogenetic memory the necessity of remembering Auschwitz does not 
arise as a radical affirmation of the power of human beings to overcome the 
process of technological self-attrition by revitalizing the ethics of conflict. 
Ultimately, the responsibility of the noetic freedom which Stiegler identifies as 
the essence of philosophy, is to redeem a catastrophic fate that has not been 
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collectively willed, but which is the condition of a messianic demand that care 
should be taken of the human species as an organological totality (2010: 185-
189). Thus, ethical recollection of Auschwitz has constantly to move between 
the Nietzschean determination to embrace the violent inevitabilities of human 
existence, which for Stiegler arise from its originary technicity, and the 
demand to consider the evil of the final solution exactly as it was enacted in 
the death camps - in all its psychical, technological and juridical perversity.  
 From the perspective of epiphylogenetic memory ethical remembrance 
of Auschwitz is essential to the future humanity of the human species. For 
insofar as it is the point at which the destruction of ‘pathological’ strains 
human life was condensed into a singular rational-bio-technological regimen, 
Auschwitz is an event that haunts every state of biopolitical exception that is 
declared after its occurrence. In Agamben’s work, which, I have argued, 
proceeds from Arendt’s account of the external relationship between law, 
technology and the organic being of the human species, the death camp is 
characterized by its complete suspension of the rights of the internees 
(Halflinge) and their subjection to death by the arbitrary decree of the SS 
officers (1998: 169-171). This, Agamben argues, this is the paradigm case of 
the biopolitical turn of sovereignty in Western politics. Ever since the Nazi 
genocide the state of exception, which is now the standard response of 
democratic states to the perceived threats of the globalized world, has 
become normalized, and this has led to a limitless proliferation of those who 
are designated as ‘bare life’ without rights or citizenship.  
 Thus, the ethico-political demand of Agamben’s work on sovereignty is 
implicit in his account of the need to transform the biopolitical state into the 
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site of a ‘bios that is only its own zoē’ (1998: 188). The question of the 
inclusive-exclusive integration of bare life (zoē) into the biopolitical 
organization of sovereignty, in other words, ought to become the defining 
political question of global-capitalist modernity. And yet, despite the analytical 
power with which this proposition is formulated in the concluding sections of 
Homo Sacer, its force seems to dissipate in the play between legal formalism 
and Heideggerian messianicity that is presented there. This is not to say that 
Agamben’s work says nothing about the global-biopolitical regime that has 
taken shape since the Second World War. However, it seems clear that if 
there is to be a general economy of political sovereignty in which the 
autonomous existence of the individual as bios includes care for life as zoē, 
then this can only come into being if the fate of the species (the biopolitical 
attrition of the law that Agamben describes) includes the possibility of 
transforming the conditions through which humanity reproduces both itself as 
spirit and as organic life (Abbinnett, 2017: 64-89).   
 It is this possibility that, for Stiegler, is configured in the idea of 
originary technicity: the chance of redemption that is sustained by the techno-
prosthetic experience of time which is unique to Dasein, and which is haunted 
by the fatal, Epimethean contingency of human life (Stiegler, 2015: 106-110). 
Without this originary provocation, the hope of transforming the state into a 
place of reflective desire and cosmopolitical hospitality would remain 
incorrigibly abstract and never penetrate the everyday economy of psychical 
and collective individuation (1998: 185-203). The spectres of Auschwitz that 
haunt the networks of biopolitical production therefore configure the radical 
evil of its occurrence within the economy of epiphylogenetic memory. For it is 
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the fact that these spectres are produced by the passage of the event into 
evolving systems of technological representation that, on the one hand, 
means we can never ‘have done’ with Auschwitz and, on the other, sustains 
the attachment of human culture to life (zoë) within the networks of 
technoscientific society.   
 This does not entail an obsession with trying to capture the literal event 
of Auschwitz, that is, computer modelling of the camps, more and more 
‘realistic’ simulations of the process of extermination, and 4G programmes 
that allow virtual access to all the sites of the Final Solution. Rather, the 
ethico-political imperative of Stiegler’s account of memory demands that we, 
as an ethnically differentiated species, move from the pure particularity of 
Auschwitz (as the ‘final solution to the Jewish question’) towards affective-
aesthetic figurations of the event that are provoked by the perpetual 
vulnerability of life to biopolitical extermination. Clearly this is no easy task, as 
the ethical significance of Auschwitz is a fiercely disputed question that is 
entwined with the global simulation of memory. As a traumatological figure it 
has been constantly invoked in the discourses and mythologies of sovereignty 
and security that have followed the Second World War - from the original 
conflict with Palestine that arose from the creation of the State of Israel, to the 
radicalization of Christian, Islamic and Zionist movements that has happened 
since 9/11 4. And yet it may be the case that the new forms of aesthetic and 
philosophical reflection that are made possible by the development of the 
technoscientific paradigm (the pharmacological eddies in the human 
experience of time that it perpetually creates) give rise to unanticipated forms 
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of recognition that remobilize the memory of the camps in ways that, partially 
and inadequately, redeem their existence.    
 Should we therefore ‘love’ Auschwitz as the revelation of our collective 
fate as human beings? Should we as a species be glad of the suffering that 
took place at Auschwitz and the network of death camps that stretched across 
Eastern Europe? The answer, of course, is no: a no that is beyond all 
consideration of the technological and economic evolution of Western 
modernity, and beyond every ‘explanation’ of the social, economic and 
psychical conditions that gave rise to the Nazi genocide. Derrida’s account of 
the unconditional nature of hospitality is instructive here. He argues that the 
‘categorical imperative’ of welcome to the stranger is simultaneously 
dependent on and independent of the violence that founds its necessity. This 
means that although the law is inseparable from historical conditions it cannot 
control, it retains an effectiveness that is distinct from who or what comes to 
threaten its existence (1997: 75-77). Both Agamben and Stiegler conceive this 
unconditional demand for hospitality/ethics as inseparable from the evolution 
of the human species as technological Dasein. For what has followed the 
event of Auschwitz is the merging of two unprecedented effects. The first is 
the tendency to biopolitical violence that has become the defining 
characteristic of international politics (Agamben, 2005: 3-4), and the second is 
the increasingly close relationship between the process of capitalization and 
the development of technoscientific programmes that have transformed the 
temporal economy of somatic, aesthetic and noetic life (Stiegler, 2011a: 187-
190).     
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 Agamben’s work on the modern state, as we have seen, presents the 
normalization of exceptional measures as the paradigm of modern politics. 
With the expansion of the global economy, the primary function of the state 
has shifted from its constitutive role in the preservation of political culture, to 
that of protecting its population from the putative threat posed by refugees, 
asylum seekers, economic migrants, guest workers, disease carriers and 
terrorists. The nature of this shift is essentially biopolitical. For insofar as 
these constituencies are defined in terms of the threat they pose to the 
integrity of the biological and genetic stock of the nation, their existence as 
‘bare life’ is subject firstly, to the mythologizing practices of culture industries 
and political interest groups, and secondly, to strategic actions through which 
the state withdraws, either partially or completely, the rights of those who 
come with nothing but their status as human beings. According to Agamben, 
this recourse to the state of exception, or iustitium, reveals the fact that 
‘citizenship’ is no more than a fictive exemption from the trauma of life without 
juridical rights, and that this exemption can be withdrawn at any time on the 
basis of a presumed complicity with a particular external and/or internal threat 
(2005: 48-51) and (1998: 134). Thus, the stakes of this biopolitical turn are 
what Arendt conceived as the political legitimacy of power. For insofar as the 
state has all but given up its role in forming the moral life of its citizens in 
favour of protecting their economic rights and biopolitical utility, a distinct kind 
of political indifference has emerged that constantly increases the 
susceptibility of human beings to arbitrary violence (Arendt, 1969: 87) and 
(1998: 147-148).   
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 The counterpart of this tendency, which is analysed in Stiegler’s 
Disbelief and Discredit, is the transhumanist trajectory that is implicit in the 
relationship between neoliberal economics and the strategic capitalization of 
biomedical, mediatic and computational technologies. Stiegler claims that, 
increasingly, human subjects are incapable of the kind of noetic reflection 
through which the social, economic and political crises of technological 
modernity can be collectively mediated. This condition is related to the 
emergence of a transhumanist ideology that presents the prosthetic 
technologies through which life is supplemented, as instruments by which the 
somatic and intellectual capacities of human beings can be intensified without 
limit (2011a: 211-218) and (2011b: 7-10). It is this assumption that has 
become the guiding thread of the neoliberal imagination. For insofar as the 
adaptability of human beings to any prosthetic environment is simply assumed 
(as well as the potential for technological solutions to all technologically 
generated risks), the deployment of new systems has taken on a functional 
necessity that has exceeded the old ‘sacrificial’ forms of ethical life. If we are 
to survive as a species, the argument goes, we must adapt ourselves as 
quickly as possible to the new forms of prosthetic life that are challenging the 
culture of human mortality. It is through the imposition of this neoliberal mode 
of transhumanism that the spectre of Auschwitz returns. As the originary 
traumatype that was formed within the epiphylogenetic memory of the West, it 
is recalled to the questions of life, as bios politicos, that arise from, firstly, the 
virtual systems that aim at the total desublimation of desire, secondly, 
biomedical cosmesis that seeks the absolute perfection of physical existence, 
and thirdly, genetic technologies that attempt to extend indefinitely the 
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duration of human life. For it is in the radical ambiguity of these ‘perfections’, 
and in their transformation of the experience of care, religiosity and 
community that constitutes the being of technological Dasein, that Auschwitz 
haunts the biopolitical economy that has emerged in our own historical epoch.   
Conclusion: Ethics and Testimony  
Human beings, as both Adorno and Arendt realized after the scale of the Final 
Solution was revealed, must resist the temptation to discharge the event of 
Auschwitz into the narrative and aesthetic forms of popular mythology 
(Adorno, 2005: 99) and (Arendt, 1994: 13-14). This is not, as Adorno 
maintained, primarily because of a responsibility to pre-empt the conditions of 
its repetition in Western liberal democracies, even though the Nazi genocide 
continues to haunt the impending breakup of the European Union and the 
right-wing populism this has provoked. Rather, as Arendt made clear in her 
commentary on the Eichmann trial and in The Origins of Totalitarianism, it is 
the global diversification of the conditions under which life can be destroyed 
with banal indifference, that constitutes the demand for ethical remembrance 
(1977: 273) and (1979: 460-479). This returns us to Stiegler and Agamben’s 
respective accounts of the relationship between law, testimony and 
inheritance, and to the specific question of how Auschwitz is to be 
remembered in the time of global-techno-scientific capitalism.   
 In Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben addresses the question of the 
witness, and the acts of poiesis through which he or she presents the fate of 
the victim who did not return from the camps. He quotes Primo Levi who, in 
The Drowned and the Saved, described the relationship between the survivor 
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and the victims who were liquidated, in the following way: ‘I must repeat: we 
the survivors, are not the true witnesses . . . we are those who by their 
prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch bottom. Those who did 
so, those who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have 
returned mute, but they are the Muslims [Muselmänner], the submerged, the 
complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have general 
significance.’ (Levi quoted in Agamben, 1999: 33). For Agamben, this 
‘paradox of testimony’ entails that the poet-witness occupies a particular 
position in the unfolding of language as a body of signs: his or her enunciation 
is what exceeds the corpus of conventional meanings which constitute the 
living present, and thereby opens the possibility of an ethical inheritance of 
the past (1999: 159-162). Testimony and poiesis therefore exist in an intimate 
relationship whose structure is revealed, firstly, through movements into 
language that are provoked by the encounter with inhuman modes of life, and 
secondly, the impossibility of representing these individual forms of existence 
(the Muselmänner) as elements of a progressive, dialectical history. The 
poiesis of testimony is related to an irreducible origin of language that cannot 
be presented within its system of linguistic signs (langue), and which founds 
the intimacy of the human and the inhuman that is the core of the subject-ego. 
As Agamben puts it, ‘the speech [parole] of the witness bears witness to a 
time in which human beings did not yet speak; and so the testimony of human 
beings attests to a time in which they were not yet human.’ (1999: 162). The 
event of Auschwitz therefore occurs as the sign of this originary structure of 
testimony, that is, as the impossibility of erasing the traumatological 
relationship of witness and victim, Muselmänn and survivor, from the 
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biopolitical organization of life that has come after the Nazi genocide (1999: 
164-165).  
 From the perspective of epiphylogenetic memory this structure of 
testimony constitutes something like a pre-technological origin: the opposition 
between the human and the inhuman that founds language and subjectivity 
comes before the technological constitution of care that, according to Stiegler, 
is the origin of self-consciousness. For Agamben, the economy of 
‘subjectification-desubjectification’ through which each living individual 
anticipates its impending loss of humanity, arises within a distribution of Being 
that ‘gives’ consciousness to the world as the place of testamentary 
responsibility (1999: 134-135). This concept of a demand that is constituted 
through the presence of trauma is close to Stiegler’s account of the poiesis of 
artistic expression, as it is through the emergence of new modes of ethico-
aesthetic performativity that exceed the schema of mass culture, that the 
biopolitical trajectory of human life sustains the possibility of its own 
subversion. The question of what these aesthetic forms might be, of course, 
requires careful analysis - for it is in the detail of their execution that the future 
of Auschwitz is configured. However, one of the primary reasons why 
Auschwitz shoud be regarded as a general schema of epiphylogenetic 
memory is the impossibility of its formal subsumption: its representation 
through haptic, or virtual, or prosthetic technologies always leaves a residue 
which those systems cannot absorb, and through which human mortalitiy 
returns as an ethico-aessthetic demand. As such, its re-presentation is 
originally related to the fate of bare life (zoë) within the systems of biopolitical 
reproduction 5. The importance of Stiegler’s concept of epiphylogenesis 
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therefore, lies in the idea that the question of ethical remembrance cannot be 
separated from the virtual and biopolitical programmes that have become the 
universal condition of being and memory after Auschwitz (2009: 71-72). 
 Agamben’s account of the purity of the structure through which the 
living individual is related to ‘the inhuman’ is, in the end, a Heideggerian 
construction that awaits the arrival of a redemptive poiesis from within the 
degraded culture of the nation state. For despite his claim in The State of 
Exception that ‘the very possibility of distinguishing life and law, anomie and 
nomos, coincides with their articulation through the biopolitical machine’, he 
ends up soliciting the creation of a political space ‘which severs the nexus 
between violence and the law’ (Agamben, 2005: 86-87). The voice of 
testimony, in other words, is the foundation of a pure law of remembrance, or 
‘profanation’, that transforms the catastrophic potential of biopolitics after 
Auschwitz (2009: 17-19). For Stiegler, on the other hand, the possibility of 
ethical remembrance arises from the originary relationship between organic 
life and its technological supplements, as it is in this proximity that the noetic 
culture of human beings is enacted. As I said in the introduction, the evolution 
of the technoscientific mode of production in the industrial democracies of the 
West, has given rise to a specific set of effects (the computational analytics of 
the programming and culture industries, the biopolitical ideology of 
globalization, the genocidal mythologies of religious fundamentalisms and 
ultra-nationalisms, and the transhumanist imaginary of neoliberal economics) 
whose aggregation has formed a new economy of fascistic politics. This 
economy is dispersed and heterogeneous in its effects, and has evolved 
through the tension that exists between the autonomous trajectory of 
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technoscientific programmes and the religious and nationalistic essentialisms 
that are their antithesis. From the perspective of epiphylogenetic memory the 
event of Auschwitz is sustained as a ‘tensor’ within this technoscientific 
economy: it is the figure that speaks through the clash of religious and 
technological immortalities that traverse the geopolitical organization of life; it 
is the traumatic memory that haunts the ultra-nationalisms that have warped 
the sovereignty of liberal-democratic states; and it is the presence of ‘flame 
and ashes’ in the fundamentalisms and sectarianisms that demand the 
annihilation of the infidel, idolater, and the unbeliever. Thus, to remember 
Auschwitz, in Stiegler’s sense of noetic inheritance, is to experience and 
express the future of humanity that inhabits the unfolding of media-bio-
technological prostheses; it is to encounter an event whose affective power 
returns constantly to the heterogeneous scenes of its exorcism, and which 




Abbinnett, Ross. (2017) The Thought of Bernard Stiegler: Capitalism, 
 Technology and the Politics of Spirit, London: Routledge. 
Abbinnett, Ross. (2015) ‘The Politics of Spirit in Stiegler’s Techno-
 Pharmacology’, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 32, no. 4, July 2015, 
 pp. 65-80.   
 34 
Adorno, Theodor , W. and Horkheimer, Max. (2011) Towards a New 
 Manifesto, trans. Rodney Livingstone. London: Verso.  
Adorno, Theodor, W, (1996) Minima Moralia, trans. Edward Jephcott. London: 
 Verso. 
Adorno, Theodor, W. et al (1994) Aesthetics and Politics, trans. Ronald 
 Taylor. London, Verso. 
Adorno, Theodor, W. (1990) Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton. London: 
 Routledge.  
Agamben, Giorgio. (2009) What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, trans. 
 David Kishik and Stafan Pedatella. Stanford, California: Stanford 
 University Press. 
Agamben, Giorgio. (2005) State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago and 
 London: University of Chicago Press.    
Agamben, Giorgio. (1999) Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the  
 Archive, trans Daniel Heller-Roazen. New York: Zone Books.  
Agamben, Giorgio. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
 trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
 Press. 
Arendt, Hannah (1994) Essays in Understanding 1930-1954: Formation, 
 Exile and Totalitarianism, Jerome Khon, ed., New York: Shocken 
 Books. 
 35 
Arendt, Hannah (1979) The Origins of Totalitarianism, San Diego, New York 
 and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.  
Arendt, Hannah (1977) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
 Evil,  Harmondsworth: Penguin.    
Arendt, Hannah (1970) On Violence, Orlando, Austin, New York, San Diego, 
 London: Harcourt Inc.  
Benjamin, Walter (1992) Illuminations, trans, Harry Zohn. London: Fontana 
 Press. 
Derrida, Jacques (1997) Of Hospitality, trans Rachel Bowlby, Stanford, 
 California: Stanford University Press.    
Derrida, Jacques (1989) Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. 
 Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press. 
Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, London: 
 Penguin.  
Golañska, Dorota (2017) ‘Bodily Collisions: Towards a New Materialist 
 Theory of Art’, Memory Studies, November 2017, published online.   
Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor, W. (1986) Dialectic of 
 Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming. New York: Continuum.  
Horkheimer, Max. (2004) The Eclipse of Reason, London and New York: 
 Continuum.     
 36 
Levi, Primo (1992) The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal, 
 London: Abacus. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1993) Libidinal Economy, trans. Ian Hamilton-Grant. 
 London: Athlone Press. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1988) The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. 
 Georges Van Den Abeele. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. (2007) Ecce Homo, trans. Duncan Large. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press.  
Rose, Jacqeline (2005) The Question of Zion, Princeton and Oxford: 
 Princeton University Press. 
Stiegler, Bernard (2015) Symbolic Misery, Volume 2: The Katastropē of the 
 Sensible, trans. Barnaby Norman. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Stiegler, Bernard (2014) The Lost Spirit of Capitalism: Disbelief and Discredit, 
 Volume 2, trans. Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Stiegler, Bernard (2013a) Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: 
 Disbelief and Discredit, Volume 2, trans. Daniel Ross. Cambridge: 
 Polity Press. 
Stiegler, Bernard (2013b) What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology, 
 trans.  Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Stiegler, Bernard (2011a) Technics and Time, Volume 3: Cinematic Time and 
 the Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen Barker. Stanford, California. 
 Stanford University Press. 
 37 
Stiegler, Bernard (2011b) The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief 
 and Discredit, Volume 1, trans. Daniel Ross. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Stiegler, Bernard (2010) Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. 
 Stephen Barker. Stanford, California. Stanford University Press. 
Stiegler, Bernard (2009) Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation, trans. Stephen 
 Barker. Stanford, California. Stanford University Press. 
Stiegler, Bernard (1998) Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, 
 trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford, California. 
 Stanford University Press.  
 
Ross Abbinnett is senior lecturer is social and political theory at the University 
of Birmingham. His latest book, The Thought of Bernard Stiegler: Capitalism, 
Technology and the Politics of Spirit, was published in 2017. He is co-director 
of the Contemporary Philosophy of Technology Research Group at 
Birmingham, and is currently working on book on the aesthetics of 
neoliberalism.   
End Notes  
                                                        
1 In the paper I will follow Giorgio Agamben’s use of the term ‘Auschwitz’ to refer 
to the Nazi genocide, rather than ‘the Holocaust’. In his book Remnants of 
Auschwitz he argues, firstly, that Elie Wiesel’s much regretted appropriation of 
the term holocaust from the scriptural economy of Judaism implies ‘an 
unacceptable equation between altars and crematoria’, and secondly, that in 
Europe the theological sense of the term had, long before the genocide, passed 
into a vernacular associated with violence against indigenous Jews. To use the 
term ‘Holocaust’, or even ‘Shoah’, therefore, is ‘to continue a semantic heredity 
that is from its inception anti-Semitic’ (1999: 31).    
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2 Lyotard’s account of the tensor in Libidinal Economy sets out the impossibility 
of representing the ‘incompossilble’ traits and effects that are gathered in the 
living individual, through the totalizing power of the proper name. He presents 
the schizophrenic personality of Daniel Schreber as the extreme point of the 
legal, moral, erotic and aesthetic conflicts through which the self exists in space 
and time, and by which s/he constantly exceeds static economy of the name/sign 
(1993: 54-55). The fact of Auschwitz, and this is something Lyotard takes up 
later on in The Differend, is a historical tensor (1988: 86-91). For insofar as its 
evil was constituted through a singular-infinite economy of racial myth, 
biotechnological science, bureaucratic procedure, ideological zeal, scatological 
enjoyment and psychological inertia, it exists as a demand for ethical 
remembrance that is always projected into the future of biotechnological life 
(1993: 60). 
 
3 One of the difficult and overdetermined questions addressed by Derrida in Of 
Spirit is that of Heidegger’s relationship to the cultural and philosophical origins 
of Nazism. Was his use of the category of spirit (Geist) after Being and Time a 
reflection of the resurgence of German nationalism, was it a cryptic declaration 
of his support for the ‘inner greatness’ of the NSDAP, or was it deployed as a 
continuation of his critique of ontology? Derrida’s answer is that it is all three, 
but that the central motif of “spirit” (which appears under erasure or in 
quotation marks throughout Heidegger’s work in the 1930s) reveals the 
fundamental tendency of his philosophy, which is to guide, to inspire and to 
compel the activity of Dasein in relation to its vocation: the revelation of Being. 
Derrida argues that the epoché used by Heidegger in relation to the power of 
spirit in the formation of man’s historical destiny, ends up as an avowal of the 
primacy of German culture and language that is all the more powerful for its 
circumlocutions (1989: 99-102). The question (Fragen), which emerged in Being 
and Time as the occasion of Dasein’s radical self-individuation, is shifted into a 
form whose tropes of fire, destiny, leadership and inspiration secretly reflected 
and intensified the cult of popular messianism that was mobilized by the NSDAP 
in its Aryan mythology. The pivotal issue here concerns what might be left of the 
ethical imperative that Heidegger sought to open within the fundamental 
ontology of Dasein after this reversion to the economy of spirit. For Derrida and 
Stiegler, what remains is the radical contingency that haunts the totality of the 
subject and its techno-symbolic attachments. For Agamben it is the originary 
relationship of witness, victim and testimony that is the essence of self-conscious 
life (1999: 164-165).   
 
4 Jacqueline Rose makes exactly this point in The Question of Zion. She contends 
that collective memory of the Holocaust as an event in Jewish history ‘has had 
the most profound effect on the birth and subsequent evolution of the fledgling 
[Israeli] nation-state’. Shame at the lack of resistance of European Jews to the 
Nazi genocide, in other words, has been mobilized as an absolute determination 
to overcome the constraints of conscience in dealing with any and all who 
threaten the existence of the Israeli homeland (2005: 140-141). 
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5 This point is made in Dorota Golañska’s article ‘Bodily Collisions: Towards a 
New Materialist Theory of Art’ (2005: 17). She argues that, from the perspective 
of a materialist version of memory studies, public art that successfully provokes 
a reflexive, cross-generational inheritance of the Nazi genocide, does so by 
brining together both the narrative/symbolic and the 
traumatic/incommunicable dimensions that comprise the facticity of Auschwitz. 
Thus, Peter Eisenman’s The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and 
Daniel Libeskind’s The Garden of Exile attempt to configure the interruption of 
progressive historical time that occurred in the death camps, and to express 
their always-impeding return to the integration of life, capital, and being that is 
the implicit telos of our historical present.  
